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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, a unanimous California Supreme Court drastically altered the landlord-
tenant relationship in California with its decision in Peterson v. Superior Court
(Paribas).2 Specifically, the Peterson court overruled that portion of the holding in
Becker v. IRM Corp.3 that imposed strict products liability on landlords for injuries
to tenants caused by a defect in the premises that the landlord did not create or
market.4 In sum, the Peterson decision is a long and welcomed victory for
California's landlords. For over a decade landlords struggled to comprehend the
justifications advanced by courts for imposing liability without fault and complained
that their insurance premiums skyrocketed as a result of the Becker decision.5 Con-
versely, the Peterson decision is a defeat for California's tenants. The implications
are catastrophic. In some situations, innocent tenants will be forced to absorb the
entire cost of personal injuries caused by defects in leased premises.
In Peterson, Nadine Peterson, a guest at the Palm Springs Marquis Hotel, sus-
tained serious head injuries while taking a shower when she slipped and fell in the
bathtub.6 Peterson alleged that the bathtub did not have any safety features such as
antiskid surfaces, grab rails, or rubber mats, which made the bottom of the bathtub
extremely unsafe when the bathtub bottom was wet and slippery.7 Peterson brought
1. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
2. 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
3. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). overruled by Peterson v. Superior Court
(Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
4. See Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1188-90. 899 P.2d at 906-07,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837-38 (concluding that
under Califomia's products liability doctrine, which provides generally that manufacturers, retailers, and others in
the marketing chain of a product are strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by a defective product, a
residential landlord may no longer be held strictly liable for an injury to a tenant caused by a defect in a leased
dwelling).
5. John Flinn, Landlords Relieved by Ruling on Liability; Defective Product Law Had Been 'Ticking Time
Bomb,' S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 23, 1995, at BI (estimating that the strict liability standard increased insurance
premiums by 15% to 25%).
6. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1189,899 P.2d at 906,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
7. Id.
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a cause of action for strict liability in tort asserting that the bathtub was a defective
product.8 The plaintiff named as defendants the owners of the hotel, among others.9
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiff from
introducing any evidence or making any reference to an action based on strict
products liability against the hotel's owners.'0 As a matter of law, the trial court held
that Becker did not apply to owners of hotels." Becker, a controversial 1985
California Supreme Court decision, held that a landlord engaged in the business of
leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in
the premises when the defect existed at the time the premises were let to the tenant. 12
Despite the trial court's ruling, the court of appeal issued an opinion directing the
trial court to permit the plaintiff to proceed on her strict liability theory.13 The appel-
late court concluded that Becker should be extended to include hotel owners and not
limited to just landlords.
4
In 1995, upon petition by the defendants, the California Supreme Court granted
review to decide whether the Becker decision allowed for the owners of a hotel to be
held strictly liable for injuries to their guests caused by defects in the premises. 5 The
court held that Becker should not be expanded to include hotel owners. 6 More
importantly, a unanimous court concluded that the Becker decision itself constituted
an "unwarranted extension" of the strict products liability doctrine and overruled its
central holding.17 Peterson, therefore, held that landlords are not within the class of
8. Id.
9. 1d The plaintiff named as defendants, among others, the owners of the hotel, Banque Paribas and Palm
Springs Marquis, Inc.; the operator of the hotel, Harbaugh Hotel Management Corporation; and the manufacturer
of the bathtub, the Kohler Company. Id.
10. Id. at 1189, 899 P.2d at 906-07,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838.
11. Id. at 1189, 899 P.2d at 907,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838.
12. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. Commentators have criticized the
Becker decision. See generally Richard Deeb, Note, A Bird in the Hand: California Imposes Strict Liability on
Landlords in Becker v. IRM Corp., 20 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 372-73 (1987) (stating that "Becker represents a vast
and unwarranted extension in the area of strict liability"); Emily M. Haliday, Comment, California's Approach to
Landlord Liability for Tenant Injuries: Strict Liability Reexamined, 26 U.C. DAVtS L. REV. 367, 423 (1993)
(concluding that the California Supreme Court should overrule Becker). But see Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund
Ursin, Strict Tort Liability of Landlords: Becker v. IRM Corp. in Context. 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 129 (1986)
(concluding that the Becker holding that landlords may be strictly liable for injuries caused by dangerously
defective conditions on leased premises is not an unprecedented step into uncharted territory, but rather, it is a
desirable application of strict liability, supported by decisions of the past two decades).
13. Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614,615 (1993), overruled by 10 Cal. 4th 1185,
899 P.2d 905,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
14. Id. at615-17.
15. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1190,899 P.2d at 907,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838.
16. Id.
17. See iUL at 1188,899 P.2d at 906,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837 (stating that "upon reexamining [sic] the basis
for Becker's holding with regard to the proper reach of the products liability doctrine, we conclude that we erred
in Becker in applying the doctrine of strict products liability to a residential landlord that is not a part of the
manufacturing or marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective product that caused the injury in question").
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persons who may properly be held strictly liable on a products liability theory for
injuries caused to their tenants by a defect in the premises."8
The obvious implication of Peterson is that tenants who are injured by a latent
defect will not be able to recover for their injuries from their landlords absent a
showing of negligence.' 9 Less obvious, but of greater concern, is that injured tenants
will be forced to absorb the entire cost of their personal injuries in some
circumstances.
The following hypothetical is an example of such a situation. The hypothetical
plaintiff is a tenant in a two-year-old 200-unit apartment building that was just
purchased by a group of investors. The tenant, while enjoying her lunch in the apart-
ment's dining nook, reaches above the table and pulls the chain to engage an over-
head ceiling fan. After a few minutes of operation, the ceiling fan's motor and blades
break free from the fan's mounting bracket and strike the plaintiff on the back of her
neck. The blow to her neck severs the spinal cord's nerve tissue and leaves her
paralyzed. The medical bills associated with the accident far exceed the plaintiff's
personal medical policy limits. Therefore, she is forced to spend her life's savings
of $50,000 on medical expenses and subsequently files for bankruptcy. Our plaintiff,
a single mother of two, is unable to return to her former occupation as a real estate
agent because she is confined to a wheelchair.
Upon investigation by experts in the construction industry, it is discovered that
the ceiling fan's motor and blades were attached to the mounting bracket with
screws, provided by the manufacturer, that were simply too small to support the
weight of the ceiling fan. The normal vibrations created by the cei*ling fan's motor
forced the screws out of the mounting bracket, causing the motor and blades to break
free. The screws were located behind a large cover plate that concealed the fan's
motor, electrical wiring, and mounting brackets, for aesthetic purposes. Therefore,
to have discovered that the screws were too small to support the weight of the fan
prior to the accident, the landlord would have had to employ an expert in the con-
struction industry to disassemble the fan and remove the screws holding up the fan's
motor and blades. Only then would it have been discovered that the ceiling fan was
defective in design because of the inadequacy of the size of the screws provided by
the manufacturer.
Under the new rule announced in Peterson, the hypothetical plaintiff would have
to show that the defendant landlord failed to use reasonable care in providing and
18. Id at 1188-89,899 P.2d at 906,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837; see id. (holding "that neither landlords nor hotel
proprietors are strictly liable on a products liability theory for injuries to their respective tenants and guests caused
by a defect in the premises").
19. Id. at 1189, 899 P.2d at 906,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837; see id. (stating that the holding does not absolve
the hotel operator or landlords "of all potential liability for such injuries"--on the contrary, hotel operators and
landlords "that breach the applicable standard of care still may be held liable under general tort principles for
injuries resulting from defects in their premises"-and that "the injured tenant or guest retains any strict products
liability cause of action that may lie against the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of a defective product that
causes the injury").
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maintaining the rented premises in a safe condition in order to recover for her injuries
from the landlord.20 Stated differently, the injured tenant must show that a reasonable
inspection by the landlord or the landlord's agents would have disclosed the defect
in the ceiling fan's design.2' Thus, under Peterson, landlords are only liable for those
injuries that result from defects in the premises that are reasonably foreseeable. In
short, it would be difficult for our hypothetical plaintiff to meet this burden since a
"reasonable inspection" would probably not require the hypothetical landlord to
remove the ceiling fan to determine if the manufacturer supplied adequately sized
screws to support the fixture. Therefore, the plaintiff would be unable to recover
damages in tort from the landlord.
However, after Becker but prior to the Peterson decision, an injured tenant could
have brought an action based on the doctrine of strict products liability against the
landlord. Under Becker, a plaintiff was not required to show that the landlord failed
to use reasonable care in maintaining the premises or that the defect was reasonably
foreseeable. Rather, the plaintiff was compensated for losses by merely showing that
a latent defect in the premises caused the plaintiff injuries.22 Under strict products
liability principles, knowledge of the hidden defect, the screws in the hypothetical,
is simply imputed against the landlord, and the tenant would be able to seek recovery
from the landlord.23
Even after Peterson, the hypothetical plaintiff would probably be permitted to
bring an action against the builder of the apartment building and could pursue the
manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of the fan under a strict products liability
theory.24 However, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which both the builder
20. See id. (stating that landlords are liable for negligent conduct); Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 467-68. 698 P.2d
at 124-25, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22 (stating that the landlord owes a tenant a duty of reasonable care in providing
and maintaining the rented premises in a safe condition).
21. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 468-69, 698 P.2d at 125-26, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23 (stating that "in the
exercise of ordinary care, the purchaser of rental property may be expected to inspect the premises not only to
determine whether they are aesthetically pleasing but also to determine whether they are safe .... The duty to
inspect should charge the defendant only with those matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable
inspection.").
22. Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1056, 751 P.2d 470.474, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
415 (1988) (stating that "[sitrict liability differs from negligence in that it eliminates the necessity for the injured
party to prove that the manufacturer of the product which caused injury was negligent. It focuses not on the conduct
of the manufacturer but on the product itself, and holds the manufacturer liable if the product was defective.").
23. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984)
(calling this imputation of knowledge of the defect in strict products liability theory "a far cry" from negligence
liability, which requires that the target defendant at least have created or failed to discover the flaw, and noting the
principal case on the distinction, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)).
24. See Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1199-200, 899 P.2d at 913-14,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-45 (noting that the
court expressed no opinion regarding whether, or under what circumstances, strict liability might be imposed upon
a landlord or hotel proprietor who participated in the construction of the building or otherwise created the defective
product that caused the injury, but also noting that it is clear that those in the chain of distribution are responsible
under a strict products liability theory).
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and those in the chain of distribution of the defective product are judgment-proof or
nonexistent.25
The possibility that an injured tenant, not unlike the hypothetical plaintiff
illustrated previously, might be unable to find a solvent defendant motivated the
Becker court to conclude that the policy justifications underlying the strict products
liability doctrine would be furthered by the inclusion of landlords within its scope.26
Becker, quoting a previous California Supreme Colprt, noted that the paramount
policy to be promoted by the strict products liability doctrine "is the spreading
throughout society of the cost of compensating . . . defenseless victims of...
defects."2'
A decade later, however, the Peterson court unanimously disagreed with this
paramount policy argument, and concluded that an injured tenant should not be
permitted to pursue the landlord under the doctrine of strict products liability. Several
reasons motivated the court to overrule Becker. First and foremost, the Becker
decision was heavily criticized and received little support in academic commentary.28
In addition, no state aside from California and Louisiana permitted an injured tenant
to pursue a tort claim against a landlord based on a theory of strict products
liability. 9 Further, the Peterson court did not believe that the policy considerations
that justify imposing strict liability exist in the landlord-tenant relationship.30 The
court described both landlords and injured tenants as "innocent victims" in latent
25. For instance, the manufacturer might be a foreign manufacturer without any assets in the United States,
essentially forcing the plaintiff to litigate or enforce the money judgment in a foreign country, or in an action
against the builder, as time elapses between the construction and the accident, it is more likely that the actual builder
will no longer be in business.
26. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 477,698 P.2d at 131,213 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (Bird, CJ., concurring). In a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Bird reasoned that "[p]lacing the economic burden of injuries on those best able to pay for
those costs while permitting the transfer of that burden to those most culpable is consistent with the equitable
considerations inherent in the resolution of the difficult problems which have been judicially posed." Id. (citation
omitted). However, Chief Justice Bird did not state why the landlord in a latent defect case is more culpable.
Arguably, the landlord and injured tenant are equally victims of a defect in the premises.
27. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
28. See infra notes 354-65 and accompanying text (discussing critical commentary of Becker).
29. Louisiana's code provides that:
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may prevent its
being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at
the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault
of the lessee and if any loss should result to the lessee form the vices and defects, the lessor shall be
bound to indemnify him for the same.
LA. CtV. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1996); see Gallager v. Favrot; 499 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(discussing a lessor's liability to his tenant for damages caused by a defect in the leased premises, and noting that
the trial court assessed damages at $10,000, but that the plaintiff tenant was awarded $2000 because he was
assigned 75% of the comparative fault).
30. See Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1202-10, 899 P.2d at 915-20,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846-51 (discussing tenant
expectations, loss-spreading, and creating a safer product); infra Part VI.
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defect cases.3? ' Therefore, the court was unwilling to place the entire burden on the
innocent landlord to compensate an equally innocent tenant.32 Finally, the court
appeared to find it significant that the manufacturer of the defective bathtub was
eager to enter into a settlement with the injured hotel guest.33 In other words, the
court was suggesting that because the manufacturer in most circumstances is
amenable, it would not be necessary to include the landlord as a potential defendant
in a products liability suit.
The purpose of this Casenote is to help explain why the Peterson court perceived
the Becker decision as "an unprecedented leap" and overruled the portion of its
holding that imposed strict products liability on landlords. However, to comprehend
the policy justifications that motivated the divergent Becker and Peterson courts, this
Casenote presents the seminal cases and legal doctrines that created a transformation
in California landlord-tenant relationships. Specifically, Part II provides background
information on both the judicial creation of an implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases, and the judicial recognition of landlord liability under ordinary
negligence principles.34 Part II discusses the evolution of the strict products liability
doctrine and also focuses on its early application in the real estate context. Part III
analyzes the Becker decision, and Part IV analyzes the subsequent cases that con-
sistently limited the controversial case to its facts.36 Part V explains why other juris-
dictions are unwilling to impose strict products liability against landlords for
defective premises.37 Part VI examines the Peterson decision,38 concluding that des-
pite the reasoning expressed by a unanimous California Supreme Court, the Peterson
decision fails to advance the public interest expressed less than a decade earlier?9
Specifically, Peterson fails to recognize the paramount policy of compensating
otherwise innocent victims of manufacturing defects. 40 Part VII proposes a legislative
solution that would require landlords to carry a catastrophic liability policy that
covers tenants who are seriously injured by defects in the premises. 4' The proposed
31. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1207,899 P.2d at 918-19,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848-50; see id. at 1207, 899 P.2d
at 919,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850 (stating that it "would be unjust to hold a hotel operator strictly liable for an injury
to a hotel guest caused by a defect in the premises, of which the hotel operator was unaware, and which would not
have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection," and pointing out that "It]he economic consequences could be
onerous for the operators .... who, through no fault of their own, could be rendered insolvent ... [by a resulting]
judgment that exceeded available insurance coverage").
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1210, 899 P.2d at 921, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851. During discovery proceedings, the Kohler
Company entered into a settlement with the plaintiff for the sum of $600,000. Id.
34. See infra Part II.
35. See id.
36. See infra Parts III, IV.
37. See infra Part V.
38. See infra Part VI.
39. See infra Part VI.B.
40. See infra Part VI.A.
41. See infra Part VII.
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solution covers only those personal injury claims that are in excess of $25,000, and
requires an injured plaintiff to pursue the manufacturer before any action is taken
against the landlord. The proffered solution is consistent with the aspirations of the
paramount policy by protecting tenants against catastrophic losses, while reducing
the number of suits brought against California's landlords based on a strict products
liability theory. ,,
II. THE ROAD TO BECKER: BACKGROUND
The Becker court's decision to apply the doctrine of strict products liability to
landlords was motivated by the judicial expansion of two distinct legal doctrines: the
implied warranty of habitability, and strict products liability.4 2 First, the court rea-
soned that the judicial expansion of tenant rights from caveat emptor to an implied
warranty of habitability provided the court with a justification to hold a landlord
liable under strict products liability principles.4 3 In other words, expansion of the
strict products liability doctrine into the landlord-tenant relationship was simply a
logical step toward ensuring that an injured tenant is compensated." Second, the
court was equally persuaded by the developments in the doctrine of strict products
liability, especially the "stream of commerce" approach.4 5 Under the stream of com-
merce approach, liability extends to all those who are part of the overall producing
and marketing enterprise of a defective product. 6 The majority in Becker reasoned
that landlords were part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise of the
defective premises and, therefore, concluded that strict liability in tort must be
extended to include landlords.47 The imposition of strict liability for latent defects
that exist at the time of renting ensures that the landlord who markets the product
"bears the costs" of injuries resulting from the defects, rather than the tenants who
are powerless to protect themselves.4
However, the Peterson court flatly rejected the justifications advanced by the
Becker court, concluding that neither the implied warranty of habitability nor the
doctrine of strict products liability warrant imposing liability without fault in latent
42. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464,698 P.2d at 122. 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (stating that the court was "satisfied
that the rationale of the... cases establishing [an implied warranty of habitability] and the doctrine of strict liability
in tort requires [the court] to conclude that a landlord engaged in the business of leasing dwellings is strictly liable
in tort for injures resulting from a latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at-the time the premises were
let to the tenant").
43. Id. at 462-63, 698 P.2d at 121,213 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 459-61, 464, 698 P.2d at 119-20, 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17, 219.
48. id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221; see id. (recognizing that "[liandlords are an integral
part of the enterprise of producing and marketing rental housing," and observing that "landlords are essential to the
rental business" and "have more than a random or accidental role in the marketing enterprise").
380
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defect cases. 49 To help comprehend and analyze the conflicting rationales expressed
in Becker and Peterson, background information on both the development of the
implied warranty of habitability and the emergence of the doctrine of strict products
liability is necessary.50 Additionally, because Peterson stated that landlords may still
be liable under ordinary negligence principles, the landmark cases discussing
landlord and tenant liability for negligent conduct are also presented.5
A. From Caveat Emptor to an Implied Warranty of Habitability
At common law, the real estate lease was considered a "conveyance" of an estate
for a term of years.52 Therefore, a lease was governed by property law concepts, not
contract law.53 Under property law principles, the lease was subject to the ancient
doctrine of caveat emptor.54 Thus, the landlord was under no duty to provide or
maintain the leased premises in a habitable condition.55 Rather, the tenant was
expected to inspect the premises and negotiate the lease based on the condition of the
land and structures. 56 This "no duty" common law concept was well suited during the
Middle Ages because the primary value of the lease was in the agricultural land itself
and not in the simple living structures on the land.57 Improvements included in the
leasehold were regarded as incidental and of secondary importance to the valuable
farmland. 8
49. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1205-09, 899 P.2d at 917-20, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848-51.
50. See discussion infra Part II.A.
51. See discussion infra Part l1.B.
52. Green v. Superior Court (Sunski), 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707
(1974).
53. See, e.g., Evans v. Faught, 231 Cal. App. 2d 698,42 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1965).
54. Brewster v. DeFremery, 33 Cal. 341, 345-46 (1867), overruled by Green v. Superior Court (Sunski),
10 Cal. 3d 616,517 P.2d 1168, 11 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990) (noting
the phrase literally means "let the buyer beware" in Latin, defining "caveat emptor" as the rule'that purchasers must
examine, judge, and test for themselves, and noting its applicability more to judicial sales and auctions and the like
rather than to sales of consumer goods because modem consumer protection laws protect the consumer-buyer
through strict products liability and warranties). See generally Jonathon M. Purver, Annotation, Modem Status of
Rules as Existence of hnplied Warranty of Habitability or Fitness for Use of Leased Premises, 40 A.L.R. 3D 646
(1971) (presenting a series of decisions that discuss the transition from caveat emptor to an implied warranty of
habitability in modem leasing transactions).
55. Cowen v. Sutherland, 14 N.E. 117, 118 (Mass. 1887). However, a statutory remedy was available to
tenants whose landlords neglected to maintain the premises in a tenantable condition. Section 1941 of the California
Civil Code provides that the lessor of a dwelling must, in the absence of a contrary agreement, put it in fit condition
for such use, and repair all subsequent dilapidations that render it untenantable, except those caused by the tenant's
negligence. However, California Civil Code § 1942 makes clear that tenants cannot compel the making of necessary
repairs. Rather, tenants can give notice of the dilapidations, and if their landlord does not repair them "within a
reasonable time" tenants may elect to make the repairs themselves and deduct the cost from the rent, or abandon
the premises and be discharged from the payment of rent or performance of the obligations. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942
(West 1985).
56. Cowen, 14N.E. at 118.
57. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 622,517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
58. Id.
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Because the actual land was the most important element of the lease transaction
and the normal lease duration was extensive, courts treated the lease as a conveyance
of an interest in land.5 9 However, as society shifted from agrarian- to industrial-
based, the modem residential lessee was not interested in acquiring an interest in the
land; rather, the lessee was merely contracting for a place to live.!° In 1974, the
California Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Green v. Superior Court, pointed
out that "today's typical city dweller, who frequently leases an apartment several
stories above the actual plot of land on which an apartment building rests, cannot
realistically be viewed as acquiring an interest in land."62 Further, the court quoted
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,63 which stated that "[w]hen American city
dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package
of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but
also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." 64 Therefore, the
Green court concluded that the application of contract principles, and not property
law, is appropriate in dealing with residential leases of urban dwelling units.65
The court, having decided that contract principles provide a more rational
framework for determining the responsibilities of the landlord, rejected the common
law rule that imposes "no duty" on the landlord to repair or maintain the leased
premises in a habitable condition.66 Instead, the court recognized a "warranty of
habitability," stating that it was implied in all "contracts" for residential leases. 7
Under the implied warranty of habitability, a residential landlord agrees to maintain
the premises in a habitable state for the duration of the lease.68 Further, a tenant's
duty to pay rent, under contract principles, is dependent upon the landlord's fulfill-
ment of his implied warranty of habitability. 69 The Green opinion makes clear that
the implied warranty of habitability does not require a landlord to provide premises
in a perfect, aesthetically-pleasing condition.70 Nevertheless, the warranty requires
that "'bare living requirements' . . . be maintained .... In most cases substantial
59. Id. at 622, 517 P.2d at 1171, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
60. Id. at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
61. 10 Cal. 3d 616,517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
62. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 623,517 P.2d at 1172, 1iI Cal. Rptr. at 708.
63. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
64. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (quoting Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 624,517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
66. Id. at 629,517 P.2d at 1176, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 624,517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709; see id. (stating that the "holding in this case reflects
[the] belief that the application of contract principles, including the mutual dependency of covenants, is particularly
appropriate in dealing with residential leases").
69. Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 914, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194. 198 (1980).
70. Id.
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compliance with . . .applicable housing code[s] . . .will suffice to meet the
landlord's obligations under the.., implied warranty of habitability .... .,71
The Green court followed a number of other jurisdictions that had discarded the
traditional doctrine of caveat emptor in favor of an implied warranty of habitability,
finding caveat emptor ihcompatible with contemporary social conditions and modem
legal values.72 Those jurisdictions that adopted an implied warranty of habitability
recognized that modem urbanization has created a factual setting that supports
placing a duty on the landlord to maintain the premises in a safe and habitable
condition.73 In other words, because present day lessees and contemporary housing
is significantly different from the agrarian model, greater protection must be given
to today's urban residential tenants.74 For instance, modern apartment buildings are
mechanically complex, making them difficult and expensive to repair.75 Electrical,
plumbing, and heating systems are hidden from view, and the landlord is usually in
a superior position to discover and repair any problems because of knowledge of
these systems.7 6 Additionally, the agrarian lessee was perceived as a "jack-of-all-
trades," who possessed the skill and knowledge to detect and repair any defects in the
premises.77 Today's city dweller, however, generally has a single, specialized skill
unrelated to maintenance work.78 Furthermore, today's urban tenant is apt to move
frequently, and therefore is less willing to make expensive repairs to property in
which the tenant has no long-term interest.79 Lastly, urbanization and population
growth has created a shortage of adequate affordable housing in almost every city.80
This shortage of affordable housing has left tenants with little bargaining power with
which they might negotiate to obtain warranties of habitability from the landlord."
Hence, the mechanism of the "free market" no longer serves as a viable means for
fairly allocating the duty to repair leased premises between landlord and tenant.
Another important factor expressed by courts for adopting the rationale that a
warranty of habitability is implied in residential leases is "consumer expectations. ' ' 2
71. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 637.517 P.2d at 1182-83. 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 619-20,517 P.2d at 1 169-70, 1ll Cal. Rptr. at 705-06; see, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'I Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280
N.E.2d 208 (Il. 1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293
N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970);
Pines v. Perssion, I I N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961).
73. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
74. Id.





80. Id. at 625, 517 P.2d at 1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 626-27, 517 P.2d at 1174-75. 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
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Courts reason that today's tenants are similar to consumers of other goods8 a The
tenant, as a consumer of housing, seeks a "package of goods" with the legitimate
expectation that "the premises will be fit for ... habitation for the duration of the
term of the lease."84 Because the landlord has primary control over the housing, and
has greater opportunity, incentive, and financial capacity to make needed repairs in
comparison to a short-term tenant, it is reasonable to place an obligation on the
landlord to maintain the "package of goods" in a safe and habitable condition.
Finally, courts recognize that the widespread enactment of comprehensive
housing codes is an additional factor for imposing upon the landlord the duty to
repair and maintain premises in a safe and habitable condition. 85 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, in Pines v. Perssion,86 observed that legislatively enacted housing
regulations demonstrate that public policy compels landlords to bear the respon-
sibility for maintaining safe, clean, and habitable housing.87 In other words, imposing
a court-created duty to provide habitable premises in residential leases is consistent
with the commitment of the legislature to render the common law rule of caveat
emptor obsolete.
The purpose of this section is to briefly introduce the reader to the justifications
that motivated courts to recognize an implied warranty of habitability. However, the
success of the doctrine is questioned by many academic commentators. In a nutshell,
commentators point out that the doctrine has not resulted in the creation of wide-
spread safer housing, and has only worsened the position of the nation's poor by
depleting the net stock of affordable housing.88
B. Landlord Liability Under the Foreseeability Test
If a landlord breaches the implied warranty of habitability, damages are deter-
mined by calculating the percentage of the reduction of habitability or "usability" of
the dwelling.89 Therefore, the hypothetical tenant described in Part I would not be
entitled to significant compensation for breach of the warranty because the difference
between the fair market rental value of an apartment with a dining nook ceiling fan
and one without the amenity would be nominal. However, the hypothetical tenant
may sue her landlord for personal injury resulting from the landlord's failure to keep
83. Id. at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711; see U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1990) (implying generally
in all contracts for the sale of goods a warranty that the goods are merchantable); id. § 2-315 (implying generally
in all contracts for the sale of goods in which the seller has reason to know of the buyer's reliance on the seller's
furnishing the goods for a particular purpose a warranty that the goods are fit for such purpose).
84. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
85. Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409,412-13 (Wis. 1961).
86. 111 N.W.2d 409.
87. Pines, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
88. See, e.g., Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in
Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979) (providing a summary of articles both
theoretical and empirical that examine landlord-tenant reforms and whether they make tenants better off).
89. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 268 A.2d 556, 562 (NJ. Dist. Ct. 1970).
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the premises in a safe and habitable condition under ordinary principles of
negligence. 90
In 1973, a California appellate court, in Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc.,
91
held that landlords are under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of
their premises and must avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.9 2
Under common law prior to Brennan, a landlord was generally not liable for injury
to a tenant, even if the injury resulted from a dangerous condition that existed at the
time the tenant took possession.9 3 The justification for this "no duty" approach to
landlord liability was that the landlord no longer had "possession" or "control" of the
property and, therefore, it would be unjust to hold a landlord liable.94 In Brennan, the
tenant-plaintiff fell and was injured while descending the back stairway when a
wrought iron railing broke free from the concrete steps.95 The lower court refused to
instruct the jury that the landlord had a duty to act as a person of ordinary prudence
in protecting others from foreseeable risks on the leased premises.96 Instead, the
lower court instructed the jury that landlords are generally not liable for injuries to
tenants that result from a dangerous condition that existed when the tenant took
97possession.
However, the appellate court stated that the traditional "no duty" rule, adhered
to in the majority of jurisdictions, was not consistent with the basic policy of
California.98 Rather, the Brennan court pointed out that California departed from the
"no duty" rule in the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian.99 Therefore, the
Brennan court concluded that, under Rowland, landlords could be liable for their
negligent actions.' °
90. See Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (1973) (stating
that "it is impossible to perceive any legitimate public interest that would be promoted by the creation of a landlord
immunity exception to [California Civil Code § 1714]" which requires all persons to act reasonably). Damages may
be calculated using a "fair rental value" approach, Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972), or a
"percentage reduction of use" approach, Academy Spires, 268 A.2d at 562.
91. 35Cal. App. 3d796, III Cal. Rptr. 122(1973).
92. Brennan, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
93. See Ayres v. Wright, 103 Cal. App. 610, 616, 284 P. 1077, 1079-80 (1930); Farber v. Greenberg, 98
Cal. App. 675, 680-81, 277 P. 534, 536 (1929); Rathbun Co. v. Simmons, 90 Cal. App. 692, 696, 266 P. 369, 371
(1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 355-356 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord
and Tenant § 17 introductory note, at 155-60 (1977).
94. See Brennan, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (rejecting the argument that "as a landlord
out of possession, [the defendant] should be held to the lesser standard of the common law rule and should be said
to have no duty of ordinary care toward a tenant in possession").
95. Id. at 799, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
96. Id. at798-99, 111Cal. Rptr. at 124.
97, Id. at 799, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
98. Id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125 (stating that "[tihe basic policy of this state, as contained in [California
Civil Code § 1714], is that every person is responsible for injuries caused to others by [the] failure to use ordinary
care or skill in the management of... property").
99. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
100. Brennan, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 801-02, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
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In 1968, the Rowland court repudiated the traditional trespasser-licensee-invitee
classifications of duties and adopted the fundamental policy that "all persons are
required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a result of their
conduct."' 0' The plaintiff in Rowland was a guest of the defendant. t02 After severely
injuring his hand on a cracked porcelain faucet handle in the apartment's bathroom,
Rowland brought an action against Christian, the tenant, based on negligence. 0 3 The
court pointed out that, in the past, the general rule was that licensees (social guests)
took the premises as they found them, defects and all, and that the possessor of the
land owed them only the duty to refrain from inflicting intentional injury upon
them.t04 The justification for the general rule that limits a tenant's liability to
licensees is premised on the idea that guests should not expect special precautions to
be made on their account.105 In other words, if the host does not desire to inspect the
premises for hazards and maintain a completely safe environment, a social guest
should not expect this to be done simply because that guest is invited on to the
property.
However, the Rowland court stated that the common law classifications of
trespasser, licensee, and invitee, and specifically the historical immunities from liabi-
lity predicated upon those classifications, did not reflect the "major factors"'t that
determine whether immunity from liability should be conferred upon the possessor
of land.'07 The court noted that adherence to the classifications led to injustice, and
that the basic policy of California set forth by the legislature was that "every one is
responsible for an injury caused to another by... want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of... property."108 Thus, under Rowland, the proper test is whether the
possessor of land acted as a reasonable person in the management of the property in
view of the probability of injury to others.1°9
101. See Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 111-12. 443 P.2d at 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100 (stating that under
California Civil Code § 1714. "[elvery one is responsible, not only for the result of... willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by [the] want of ordinary care or skill in the management of... property or person,
except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself" (quoting
California Civil Code § 1714)). Further, the court stated that any "departure from this fundamental principle
involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved."
Id. at 112-13,443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
102. Id. at 110, 443 P.2d at 563, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101 (citing Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 102,272
P.2d 26,32 (1954); Oettingerv. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133. 137, 148 P.2d 19,21 (1944)).
105. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF ToRTs 1477 (1956).
106. See supra note 101 (listing the major factors).
107. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 117,443 P.2d at 567,70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
108. Id. at 111-12, 117,443 P.2d at 563-64.567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100, 107.
109. Id. at 119,443 P.2d at 568,70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
386
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 28
Although the tenant was being sued in Rowland, the Brennan court pointed out
that the fact that a landlord is not in possession or control of the premises is not a
legitimate justification for creating landlord immunity from liability.1 Instead, the
court stated that possession and degree of control over the premises are significant
factors to be weighed in determining whether the landlord acted as a reasonable
person under all the circumstances."' While a broad discussion of what constitutes
"unreasonableness" is beyond the scope of this Casenote, the accepted principle,
commonly referred to as the "Hand Formula," is that conduct is deemed unrea-
sonable if the probability and gravity of injury to third persons exceeds the burden
of adequate precautions and the social utility of the defendant's conduct."1
2
For instance, in Peterson, the plaintiff would probably have been successful in
a negligence action against the hotel operators. The plaintiff stated that the bathtub
had no safety measures such as antiskid surfaces, grab rails, or rubber mats."
3
Applying the Hand Formula to the facts of Peterson, the financial burden associated
with equipping each bathtub throughout the hotel with rubber mats and grab rails
would not be that great. On the other hand, it would not be unlikely that a hotel guest
would slip in a bathtub, especially one with which the guest is not familiar. Further-
more, injuries associated with slipping in a bathtub are often severe and sometimes
fatal. Therefore, a jury would likely have found that the hotel operators were unrea-
sonable in failing to equip the bathtub with safety measures because the costs of such
precautions would be much less than the likelihood of guests being seriously injured.
C. Emergence of Strict Products Liability
During the period that the courts decided Green and Brennan, there was growing
public and private concern over the quality of the nation's housing stock.,"4 Local
enforcement of state housing codes was woefully inadequate., 5 Therefore, the
judicially created duty to provide habitable housing and the elimination of landlord
immunity from ordinary negligence principles were perceived as necessary to pro-
vide consumers with safe and clean places to live. Similarly, beginning in the early
1960s, the California Supreme Court recognized the need to protect consumers from
110. Brennan, 35 Cal. App. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
111. Id.
112. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (explaining that
reasonability is influenced by the following formula: if the probability is called P, the magnitude of the loss L, and
the burden B, then liability depends on whether B is less than L multiplied by P).
113. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
114. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Installment Land Contract as Lease: Habitibilit. Protections and the Low-Income
Purchaser, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 298-99 (1987). The policy behind courts adopting an implied warranty of
habitability was to force the rehabilitation of substantially defective slum dwellings, so that the nation's poor could
have a safe and healthy place to live. As one commentator stated, dilapidated housing creates filth that spreads to
the streets, breeding disease if not crime, and creating an eyesore and a public disgrace. Id. at 299.
115. Id. at 299.
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defective products. In 1963, in the seminal case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,16 the California Supreme Court accepted the doctrine of strict
products liability, and held that a manufacturer's liability was absolute for injuries
resulting from a defectively dangerous product."t7 The Greenman court was the first
to impose tort liability irrespective of fault."18 In other words, under the doctrine of
strict products liability, the seller of a defective product is still liable for the physical
harm to the purchaser, even though the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product." 9
1. Justifications for Imposing Strict Products Liability
In Greenman, the court stated that a "manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."'' 0 The
plaintiff in Greenman was seriously injured by a defectively designed power tool,
and brought an action against both the retailer and the manufacturer.12' Prior to
Greenman, a manufacturer's liability for defective products was usually governed
by the law of contract warranties. 22 However, the Greenman decision made clear
that liability for defective products is now governed by the law of strict liability in
tort and not by the intricacies of express sales warranties.
23
Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court in Greenman, stated that the
fundamental "purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries re-
sulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that [place defective]
products on the market[,] rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves."' 24 In other words, one who makes the product should be held
116. 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
117. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901-902,27 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
118. See id.
119. Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 44 Cal. 3d 1049. 1056, 751 P.2d 470,474,245 Cal. Rptr. 412,
415(1988).
120. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900,27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
121. Id. at 59.377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The power tool was a Shopsmith, a combination power
tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe. The plaintiff's "expert witnesses testified that inadequate
set screws were used to hold parts of the machine together so that normal vibration caused the tailstock of the lathe
to move away from the piece of wood being turned permitting it to fly out of the lathe [and] ... that there were
other more positive ways of fastening the parts of the machine together, the use of which would have prevented the
accident." Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
122. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see RESTATElMENT (SECOND) oFToRTs § 402A (1979) (stating that sellers engaged in the business
of selling products liable for physical harm for such of their products that are expected to and do reach the consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which they were sold and are in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer or to the consumer's property); see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,
132-35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,441-43 (1972) (rejecting section 402A's requirement that the
product defect be "unreasonably dangerous" on the ground the requirement rings of negligence, and holding that
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responsible for the injuries associated with the defects. It should be noted that Justice
Traynor's justification is not a "deep pocket" theory, rather it is a "loss-spreading"
theory'5--the manufacturer has the capacity to distribute the loss it incurs as a result
of an action based on strict liability for a defectively designed product. The
assumption is that the manufacturer can shift the cost of damage awards to the many
purchasers of the product in the form of higher prices. 26
In addition to the "loss-spreading" justification articulated by Justice Traynor,
three other important policy justifications have been advanced by courts for imposing
liability without fault on manufacturers. First is the "consumer expectation" justi-
fication. 27 In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,t28 Justice Traynor, in a concurring
opinion, pointed out that handicrafts have been replaced by the mass production of
complicated and technical goods, and that the close relationship between the pro-
ducer and the consumer no longer exists. 29 Additionally, modem products are often
complex and well packaged. Therefore, the average consumer no longer has the skill
or means to adequately investigate a product for defects. 13 Instead, today's consumer
simply relies on the reputation and advertising of the manufacturer and expects that
the product is safe for the uses for which it has been marketed. 3' Justice Traynor
reasoned that because manufacturers create expectations of safety through adver-
tising and marketing devices, they should be held strictly liable for injuries caused
by their defective products. 32
Another policy justification advanced by courts for imposing on manufacturers
the strict products liability doctrine is that the burden of proving specific acts of
negligence is often impossible. 33 Many products today are complicated and would
require the plaintiff to hire numerous expert witnesses that are familiar with the
engineering and manufacturing process to identify and prove accurately that the
all that need be shown is a product defect that proximately caused injury).
125. KEETON El AL., supra note 23, § 98, at 693.
126. Id.
127. Justice Traynor had earlier stated that the "consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate
for himself the soundness of a product.... and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-marks [sic]. Consumers
no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith, relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the
trade mark." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
128. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
129. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
130. Id.
131. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976).
132. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 467-68, 150 P.2d at 443-44 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor believed that
"the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases
[involving defective products].... (lit should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs absolute liability when
an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to human beings." Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). The California Supreme
Court, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products hIc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), eventually
adopted Justice Traynor's classic concurring opinion.
133. Phipps, 363 A.2d at 958.
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manufacturer was negligent. 34 Unfortunately, the added litigation costs associated
with proving specific facts of negligence, if possible, would make it difficult for the
average consumer to prevail in an action against the manufacturer of a defective
product.
A final justification advanced by courts is that the imposition of strict liability
in tort will result in "safer products." In Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,,35 the
Supreme Court of Oregon stated that "in the final analysis, the imposition of liability
has a beneficial effect on manufacturers of defective products both in the care they
take and in the warning they give.',' 36 The theory is that requiring manufacturers to
bear the cost of injuries creates an incentive to produce safer products. 37 However,
some commentators argue that imposing strict liability will not induce any greater
care than liability based on negligence because manufacturers simply pass the added
cost of insuring against lawsuits to the consumer in the form of higher prices. 38 In
addition, the development of innovative products might actually be inhibited, because
manufacturers might fear the possibility of being hailed into court, despite their
exercise of reasonable care in producing a new product.
39
2. Expanding the Applicability of Strict Products Liability
Less than a year after the celebrated Greenman decision, the California Supreme
Court began to expand the use of the doctrine by applying strict products liability to
other entities involved in the distribution of a defective product. For instance, in
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 40 the court concluded that policy considerations
warranted the imposition of strict liability in tort upon retailers who distribute injury-
causing, defective products to the public. 4' In Vandermark, the plaintiff seriously
injured himself as a result of defective brakes that caused his car to swerve off the
freeway and collide with a light post. 42 In addition to Ford Motor Company, the
plaintiff brought suit against Maywood Bell Ford, an authorized dealer. 43 Writing
for the court, Justice Traynor harkened back to the justifications first presented in
Escola, and concluded that retailers, like manufacturers, should be liable regardless
of fault. '4 Additionally, Justice Traynor pointed out that Maywood Bell Ford, as an
authorized dealer, was an integral part of the overall distribution system of the
134. See id.
135. 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
136. Philips, 525 P.2d at 1042.
137. Id. at 1041-42.
138. KEETONErAL.,supra note 23, § 98. at 693.
139. id.
140. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
141. Vandennark, 61 Cal. 2d at 263, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
142. Id. at 258, 391 P.2d at 169.37 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 261, 263, 391 P.2d at 170, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 898, 900.
390
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defective automobile. Therefore, it should bear the cost of injuries resulting from
marketing the automobile also. 45 Additionally, Vandermark recognized that in some
cases the retailers might be the only members in the chain of distribution that are
amenable. 46 Furthermore, the court believed that retailers could exert pressure on the
manufacturers to produce-safer products. 47 The court suggested that retailers would
do business only with those manufacturers that consistently produced safe products
because this would relieve the retailer of the fear of lawsuits.4 Lastly, the court
reasoned that imposing strict tort liability upon both the retailer and the manufacturer
afforded maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and worked no injustice on the
defendants because they could adjust the costs associated with the loss between them
in the course of their continuing business relationship.
49
Strict liability has also been applied to lessors of personal property. In Price v.
Shell Oil Co., 50 Flying Tiger Airline leased from Shell Oil Company a gasoline truck
used for refueling aircraft.'5 ' The plaintiff, an employee of Flying Tiger, injured
himself when he fell from a defective ladder mounted on the gasoline truck.52 The
ladder was installed under Shell's direction, and both Shell and Flying Tiger
inspected it. 1 The injured aircraft mechanic brought an action against Shell alone."5
Price concluded that there was "no substantial difference between [s]ellers of
personal property and non-sellers [sic], such as ... lessors." 55 The court pointed out
that "in each instance, the seller or non-seller [sic] places the product on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects.' 5 6 Furthermore, the
court sought to promote the policy of protecting victims of manufacturing defects.
Thus, "it should make no difference that the party distributing the [product] has
retained title to it.' 57 Lastly, the court reasoned that the leasing company could
spread the loss of compensating injuries by an adjustment in the price of the rental
equipment. 5




149. Id. at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
150. 2 Cal. 3d 245,466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
151. Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 248,466 P.2d at 723, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
152. Id. at 248-49, 466 P.2d at 724, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
153. Id. at 248, 466 P.2d at 724, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
154. Id. at 249. 466 P.2d at 724, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
155. Id. at 251,466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 251,466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
158. Id.
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3. Strict Products Liability Applied in the Real Estate Context
a. Mass-Produced Homes
California's lower courts, armed with the policy justifications presented in both
the Greenman and Vandermark decisions, rapidly expanded the application of strict
liability in tort. In Kreigler v. Eichler Homes,5 9 a California appellate court held that
a homeowner could recover against the builder of mass-produced homes on the basis
of strict products liability for a defective radiant heating system.'6° Prior to Kreigler,
liability without fault had only been applied in cases involving personal property, not
real property. 16' However, the court reasoned that no meaningful distinction existed
between Eichler Homes's mass production of housing and the mass production of
other goods, such as automobiles.
62
The Kreigler court was motivated by the recent developments in the field of
strict products liability and suggested that the judiciary was actually obligated to
extend the doctrine into other areas beyond the traditional product setting, like mass-
produced homes. 63 The Kreigler court stated an "exceptionally able and well thought
out opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey" inspired the decision to hold
builders strictly liable in tort.' 64 In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 65 scalding hot water
drawn from a defective faucet installed by the builder burned a child. 66 The New
Jersey Supreme Court concluded that public interest required a developer of mass-
produced homes to bear the costs that result from defective construction, rather than
the injured party, for two fundamental reasons. 67 First, the builder was in the better
economic position to absorb the costs associated with the injury. 68 Second, the
injured party justifiably relied on the builder's implied representation that the
advertised model was free from construction defects.
69
The Kreigler court believed that the plaintiff relied on the skill and reputation of
the builder, and concluded that Eichler Homes should be held strictly liable for the
defective heating system. 17 Apparently, other pertinent policy considerations also
159. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
160. Kreigler, 269 Cal. App. at 228-29, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
161. Id. at 22,7, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 227-28, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752 (citing Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965)).
165. 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
166. Schipper, 207 A.2d at 317-18.
167. Id. at 325-26.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Kreigler, 269 Cal. App. 2d at 228-29, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
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compelled the court-in particular, the economic ability of the builder to bear the
cost associated with the defective construction.7 "
However, in Oliver v. Superior Court (Regis Builders, Inc.), 'n2another California
appellate court limited the application of the strict products liability doctrine to
builders of mass-produced homes. 173 The court held that the justifications articulated
in the Kreigler decision did not provide a basis for extending the doctrine of strict
liability to a contractor who had only built two homes. 74 Likewise, in La Jolla
Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Superior Court (Quality Roofing, Inc.), 175 another
California appellate court precluded a strict liability action against a subcontractor.
76
The court reasoned that extending the doctrine to include subcontractors would result
in higher housing costs. 177 The additional costs to the subcontractor for insurance
premiums would be passed on to the developer of the mass-produced homes, who
in turn would pass it on to the home-buying public.178 Furthermore, a plaintiff is




Less than five months after the Kreigler court concluded that builders of mass-
produced homes are strictly liable for defective construction, California's strict pro-
ducts liability evolution advanced yet another step. In Avner v. Longridge Estates, 80
an appellate court held that a developer of residential lots is strictly liable for the
defective preparation of the soil.' 8' Longridge Estates developed a tract of hillside
residential lots sometime prior to 1960.182 In 1965, the lot settled due to inadequate
grading, insufficient compacting, and poor drainage. 8 3 Relying on the recent holding
in Kreigler, the plaintiffs asserted a claim based on strict products liability, and
argued that the developer manufactured the product, here the lot, by grading, filling,
and cutting the soil. 84 The defendants argued that although a land developer im-
proves the lot, the developer "does not alter the basic characteristics of the soil and
17 1. Id. at 227-28, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53 (accepting the rationale of the Schipper court that addressed the
loss-spreading justification).
172. 211 Cal. App. 3d 86, 259 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1989).
173. Oliver, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 89,74 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
174. Id.
175. 212 Cal. App. 3d 1131, 261 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1989).
176. La Jolla Village Homeowners Ass'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
177. Id. at 1145-46, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1144, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
180. 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
181. Avner, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
182. Id. at 608, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
183. Id. at 609, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
184. Id.
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must contend with the various natural and latent conditions that exist in the soil." 185
The defendants noted that neither the builder of mass-produced homes nor the manu-
facturer of personal property was forced to contend with this burden.
86
Referring to the Kreigler decision, the Avner court stated that it was unable to
distinguish the obligation of a builder to the buyer of a home with a defective heating
system from the obligation of a developer to the owners of a failing lot.'8 7 Avner
reasoned that a contrary ruling would require purchasers of lots to employ soil
engineers to investigate for defects that are located several feet beneath ground.188 To
relieve lay persons of this expensive undertaking, the court favored imposing liability
without fault upon the developers of residential lots. 89
4. Strict Products Liability Applied to Landlords
In 1972, California expanded the doctrine of strict liability in tort into the
landlord-tenant relationship. In Fakhoury v. Magner,90 the court held that a landlord,
who leases a "furnished" apartment, is strictly liable for injuries that result from the
apartment's defective furniture.' 9' In Fakhoury, the tenant was injured when the sofa,
provided as part of the lease, collapsed. 92 The court articulated the "loss-spreading"
justification presented by Justice Traynor in Escola as the primary reason for holding
the landlord of a furnished apartment strictly liable. 93 Fakhoury was a case involving
"defective furniture," not "defective premises."'94 Thus, the court applied the doctrine
of strict products liability to the landlord, not as the lessor of real property, but as the
lessor of furniture. 95 The landlord in Fakhoury furnished five apartment units with
identical sofas that he personally purchased from the manufacturer.' 96 Most signi-
ficantly, the court insisted that the landlord was engaged in the enterprise of leasing
furniture, in addition to the enterprise of leasing apartments. 97 For this additional
enterprise he received increased rents. 98 Relying on the holding of Price, the
Fakhoury court concluded that a landlord was strictly liable for leasing defective
185. Id. at 611, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
191. Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
192. Id. at 61, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
193. Id. at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 477; see id. (stating that the lessor can recover the cost of protection by
charging for the costs in the lessor's business).
194. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
197. Id. at 63-64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
198. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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furniture." As mentioned previously, Price held that strict products liability was
applicable to lessors of personal property.200 Simply put, the Fakhoury court was not
willing to exempt the defendant from the holding in Price just because he was the
owner of the apartment in addition to being the lessor of a defective sofa
201
The Fakhoury decision can be viewed as the first case to stretch the application
of the doctrine of strict products liability beyond its intended practicality. The court
made some attempt to narrow the holding by suggesting that a casual or isolated
lease transaction would not bring the doctrine into play.20 2 Nevertheless, the court
believed that furnishing five apartments was not casual or isolated, and this satisfied
the newly created threshold. Remember the court, relying on Price, applied the
doctrine to the defendant for his participation in the enterprise of leasing furniture,
not for leasing a dwelling. 20 3 However, in Price, the defendant was Shell Oil Com-
pany, who leased gasoline trucks that refueled aircraft*204 In other words, Price
involved a true leasing enterprise and is thus easily distinguished from the facts of
Fakhoury. It is difficult to accept the idea that the landlord was engaged in the
separate enterprise of leasing furniture by simply furnishing five apartments.
Additionally, the "loss-spreading" justification articulated by the Fakhoury court is
questionable. Clearly, Shell Oil Company had the ability to spread the loss of com-
pensating victims of defective equipment among its many customers. However, a
lessor who provides furniture to only a total of five tenants probably lacks this
ability. A landlord who leases a furnished apartment can recover the cost of insuring
against a loss by simply charging tenants an increased rate, but this is markedly
different than the "loss-spreading" theory first articulated by Justice Traynor in
Escola. °s
Whatever distinctions the Fakhoury court was purporting to establish between
defective furniture and defective premises became less clear four years later in
Golden v. Conway.2 6 In Golden, the tenant sought to recover for damages to his in-
ventory caused by a fire that resulted from an improperly installed wall heater.20 7 The
landlord had purchased the heater a year or two before the fire.20 8 The tenant leased
the building for commercial use, but the premises featured a kitchen and bathroom,
and the landlord was aware that the tenant's employee was living on the premises. 2 9
199. Id.
200. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251-52, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1970).
201. Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
202. Id. at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
203. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
204. Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 248, 466 P.2d at 723, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
205. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.. 24 Cal. 2d 453,462, 150 P.2d 436,441 (1944) (stating that "the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business").
206. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
207. Golden, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 952, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
208. Id. at 953, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
209. Id. at 962, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
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The court concluded that a lessor of real property who is engaged in the business of
leasing commercial buildings with attached living quarters and who "equips" the pre-
mises with defective appliances, is strictly liable in tort.2'0 The fact that the landlord
had actually purchased the heating unit apparently moved the court.2 Prior to
Golden, a court permitted a tenant to bring an action under the doctrine of strict
liability for injuries that resulted from defective furniture, but not from defective
appliances that were part of the apartment's original construction.2 Arguably, the
court would not have imposed strict liability if a wall heater that a prior owner
purchased and installed caused the accident. The Golden court stated that it saw no
reason to distinguish between appliances that are attached to the realty and furniture
that is not.
213
Under the holding in Golden, the Fakhoury court's requirement of a "separate
enterprise" was no longer necessary.214 The Golden court simply applied strict
liability to the landlord as a lessor of real property, not as a lessor of an attached wall
heater. Rather than discussing Fakhoury's requirement of a "separate enterprise," the
court presented the three policy considerations articulated by the Price court to
support the decision to impose liability without fault upon landlords. In particular,
the Golden court pointed out that tenants are "virtually powerless" to protect
themselves against defective appliances.2 '5 Additionally, the landlord can recover the
added cost of protecting tenants by increasing rents to offset higher insurance
premiums.216 Lastly, the landlord has a better opportunity than does the injured tenant
to recoup from the party primarily responsible for the defect that causes the injury.
217
III. THE PARAMOUNT POLICY: BECKER V. IRM CORP.
California's strict products liability evolution reached its pinnacle in 1985 as a
result of the California Supreme Court's decision in Becker. Becker held that a land-
lord engaged in the business of leasing apartments is strictly liable in tort for injuries
resulting from a latent defect in the premises.2 8 Prior to Becker, landlords were liable
only for those injuries that resulted from their negligent conduct.219
210. Id. at 961-62, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text (discussing Fakhoury).
213. Golden, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
214. Id. at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
215. Id. at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (quoting Fakhour., 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476).
216. Id. (quoting Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476).
217. Id. (quoting Fakhoury, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476).
218. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454,464,698 P.2d 116, 122,213 Cal. Rptr. 213,219 (1985), overruled
by Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
219. See Brennan v. Cockrell Invs., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801-02, II1 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1973); supra
notes 91-99 and accompanying text (examining the Brennan decision).
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In Becker, the plaintiff slipped while in the shower and fell through the shower's
glass door.220 As a result of the fall, he severely lacerated his arm.22' The plaintiff
argued that the shower door was defective, and brought an action against the landlord
for his personal injuries, based on strict products liability.222 The manufacturer
fabricated the shower door with untempered glass, although tempered glass was
available at the time of the accident. 223 The use of tempered glass would have sub-
stantially reduced the tenant's injuries.
224
Unlike Fakhoury, which involved the separate enterprise of leasing furniture, and
Golden, which involved an appliance that the landlord had purchased, Becker
involved a product that the previous owners of the building did note purchase or in-
stall.2"25 Although the defendant-landlord was not involved with any phase of the
construction process, a majority of the court was convinced that the doctrine of strict
products liability should be extended to include landlords who purchase buildings
that have pre-existing defects that cause injuries.?
A. Imposing Strict Products Liability
Writing for the majority of the court, Justice Broussard relied on what can be
called the "paramount policy" justification, and concluded that the doctrine of strict
products liability was applicable to landlords. 2 7 The "paramount policy" is "the
spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless
victims [of defective products]. 228 The court first introduced this policy in Escola
but did not term it the paramount policy. Rather, the court introduced it as simply one
of a number of policy considerations that supported imposing liability without
fault.? 9 However, twenty-six years later in Price, the California Supreme Court
suggested that the "loss-spreading" form of compensating victims was actually the
paramount purpose of the doctrine.?0 Justice Broussard, in the majority opinion in
Becker, simply referred to the justification as the "paramount policy. '2 3' The other





225. Id. at 457-58, 698 P.2d at 117-18, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
226. Id. at 465-67,698 P.2d at 123-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
227. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
228. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
229. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that "the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business").
230. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251-52, 466 P.2d 722, 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 181-82
(1970).
231. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptt. at 220; see Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 251, 466 P.2d
at 725-26, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82 (stating that "[e]ssentially the paramount policy to be promoted by the rule is the
protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the
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justifications advanced in earlier cases, such as creating safer products, consumer
expectations, and the costly burden of litigation, no longer appeared to influence the
court equally. In fact, the Becker majority opinion only touched on the other policy
considerations in relation to the facts of the case. 32 The majority never reasoned that
by imposing strict liability apartments would become safer, or that tenants truly rely
on landlords to protect them from unforeseeable defects in the premises. Rather, the
court focused its decision on the need to compensate the victims of latent defects.
In addition to focusing on the "paramount policy," the majority reasoned that the
continued judicial expansion of strict products liability, coupled with the court's
recognition of an implied warranty of habitability, supported the court's decision to
extend the doctrine into the landlord-tenant setting.233 Stated differently, the court
reasoned that imposing liability without fault on landlords was simply a logical step
in the natural progression of the law in Califomia.34 This natural progression of the
law argument is not surprising since legal commentators predicted that strict liability
in tort would eventually become applicable to residential landlords. For example, in
1977, Harry Miller and Marvin Starr stated that there was a strong probability that
landlords would be held strictly liable in tort to all persons injured regardless of the
landlord's negligence3 5 Further, Miller and Starr pointed out that "[t]he application
of the doctrine of strict liability to a lessor of residential premises is a natural and
logical extension of the present judicial development of the tort.' ' 36 Additionally, in
1984, a year prior to the Becker decision, Professor Keeton hinted that apartment
landlords would eventually face imposition of the strict products liability doctrine
upon them.37
An apartment building is significantly different than the typical product produced
by the manufacturer and marketed by the retailer and distributor. It is generally older,
composed of countless complex fixtures and appliances, and several tradespeople
have constructed it. The majority sidestepped the unique nature of the apartment
building by recognizing that Kreigler and Avner had used the doctrine in the real
estate context.23 Thus, the majority simply considered the apartment a product
similar to a mass-produced home or a manufactured residential lot. Justice Broussard
pointed out that California extended liability to all those who were part of the
cost of compensating them").
232. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 463-67, 698 P.2d at 121-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218-21.
233. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
234. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
235. HARRY D. MILLER& MARVIN B. STARR. 4 CURRENT LAW OFCALFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 27:77, at 380
(1977); see Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (discussing the implied warranty of
habitability and concluding that the case law that establishes the duties of a landlord and the doctrine of strict
liability in tort requires the imposition of strict liability upon landlords).
236. MILLER & STARR, supra note 235, § 27:77, at 380 (original emphasis omitted).
237. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 104A. at 722 ("[A]II the rules related to... strict liability in tort are
likely to become applicable as against that king of lessor or landlord who can be regarded as being engaged in the
business of renting apartments and other structures as part of his business as a realtor.").
238. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 460-61, 698 P.2d at 119-20,213 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17.
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"overall producing and marketing enterprise of a defective product." 9 The court
observed that, although the landlord was not engaged in the distribution of the
product in the same manner as a manufacturer, retailer, or lessor, the landlord did
provide the product to the public, and therefore played a substantial role in the
overall enterprise that made housing available to the renters.240 Therefore, the
landlord should be strictly liable 24'
B. Absence of the Continuing Business Relationship
The defendant in Becker argued "that a landlord who purchases an existing
building which is not new should be exempt from strict liability in tort for latent
defects because, like dealers in used personalty, [landlords are] not part of the manu-
facturing and marketing enterprise."2 42 The defendant relied on Vandermark, in
which the court suggested that no "injustice" would result by holding a retailer
strictly liable because the retailer could, in the course of the continuing business
relationship with the manufacturer, adjust the costs of insuring against being held
strictly liable between themselves.2 43 The landlord in Becker correctly pointed out
that it had never had a business relationship with the builder, and therefore would not
be able to adjust the insurance costs associated with protecting tenants. 244 Rather, the
landlord would have to absorb all the costs of insuring against defects in the pre-
mises.245 Nevertheless, the court stated that "a continuing business relationship is not
essential to imposition of strict liability," and "[t]he unavailability of the
manufacturer is not a factor militating against liability of others engaged in the enter-
prise."2 Instead the court reasoned that the "paramount policy" of the rule remained
the spreading throughout society of the costs of compensating defenseless victims.247
The Becker court's decision to overlooklthe absence of a continuing business
relationship was surprising in light of Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior
Court (Pere),248 decided by an appellate court five years earlier. Tauber-Arons
Auctioneers held that a dealer of used machinery is not strictly liable, primarily
because the underlying rationale of Vandennark was not applicable to dealers of used
239. Id. at 459, 464, 698 P.2d at 119, 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216, 219 (quoting Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
240. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
241. Id.




246. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
247. Id.
248. 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980).
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goods. 49 In particular, the court refused to impose strict liability in tort because the
used machinery dealer did not have the requisite continuing business relationship
with the manufacturer.250 Similarly, buyers of used rental properties do not have
continuing business relationships with builders.25' However, the court ignored this
argument, and decided to hold the landlord strictly liable.
C. An Unusual and Unjust Burden
Justice Lucas, joined by Justice Mosk, accused the majority of taking an
"unprecedented leap," and imposing "'an unusual and unjust burden' on property
owners." 22 Justice Lucas was troubled by the imminent adverse economic effects
of the majority's decision.'" He noted that, by imposing strict liability, landlords
would be faced with liability for every injury resulting from any defect in the entire
building, whether it was reasonably foreseeable or not.2 4 Ultimately, the dissenting
opinion concluded that the imposition of absolute liability would result in an increase
in the price of rental housing, in large part because of the increased cost of
insurance.2 5'
In addition to the economic implications of the majority's opinion, Justice Lucas
was disturbed that the majority's'opinion gave no meaningful consideration to the
requirement of a continuing business relationship with the defective product's manu-
facturer.' He reasoned that, unlike retailers and lessors, or others in the original
chain of distribution of the product, landlords could not adjust the costs of insuring
against the losses associated with defects in the premises. 25 Rather, a landlord could
249. Tauber-Arons Auctioneers, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 798; see id. (stating that "the
ordinary used machinery dealer has no continuing business relationship with the manufacturer in the course of
which he can adjust the cost of protection from strict liability[, and thus] the rationale which underlies Vandermark
simply is inapplicable to such a dealer").
250. Id.
251. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
252. Id. at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Dwyer
v. Skyline Apartments Inc., 301 A.2d 463,467 (N.J. App. Ct. 1973)).
253. Id. at 485-86, 487 n.6, 698 P.2d at 137-38, 139 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35, 236 n.6 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Lucas wrote:
The majority never considers the economic effect of its holding. The only logical result is that the price
of rental housing will increase because of the increased cost of insurance, assuming insurance can be
obtained for this purpose. Even if landlords can sue participants in the original line of manufacture and
marketing, the litigation costs involved will likely also have an effect on the price of rental housing.
Arguably, instead of risk distribution, the majority's conclusion will result in a general increased cost
attributable to the risks involved without a concurrent benefit. Someone will have to pay for the
additional litigation today's decision is likely to create.
Id. at 487 n.6, 698 P.2d at 139 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.6 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
254. Id. at 479, 698 P.2d at 133, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Dityer,
301 A.2d at 467).
255. Id. at 487 n.6, 698 P.2d at 139 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.6 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
256. Id. at 483-86, 698 P.2d at 136-38, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 233-35 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
257. Id. at 485, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
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only adjust the costs down the chain of distribution, namely by charging tenants
higher rents.25'
Justice Lucas never fully discussed the societal detriment of only adjusting the
costs of insuring against strict liability actions down the chain of distribution. How-
ever, he probably suggested that the overall costs associated with protecting the con-
sumer should be borne by those profiting from the enterprise, not by the consumer.
Justice Lucas's desire to keep California's tenants from bearing the costs of insuring
against strict products liability actions, in the form of higher rents, was admirable but
problematic for two reasons. First, Justice Lucas appeared to be suggesting that, in
the typical consumer product setting, all the members in the chain of distribution
share in the costs of insuring against the risks of products liability actions. However,
it is doubtful that any member of the chain of distribution actually forfeits any profits
to insure against these risks. In other words, the cost of insurance is always passed
on to the consumer in the form of higher prices for the product. Justice Traynor, in
the classic Escola concurrence, states that "the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. '' s9 Thus,
whether up or down the chain of distribution, the consumer inevitably bears the cost
of insurance. Second, Justice Lucas's concern about forcing California's tenants to
absorb the cost of insuring against actions failed to recognize the trade-off.
Specifically, under Becker, tenants were protected against injuries that were not
compensable under traditional negligence principles.
Finally, in addition to the absence of a continuing business relationship and the
economic implications of strict liability, Justice Lucas reasoned that imposing strict
liability on landlords would not result in safer housing for California's tenants.2 °
One of the hallmark justifications for adopting the strict products liability doctrine
was the notion that it would inevitably result in safer products reaching the market. 2
t
Justice Lucas pointed out that, because landlords generally do not have a continuing
relationship with the suppliers and manufacturers of the many products within the262
building, landlords really have no influence over design safety. On the other hand,
a retailer who has a continuing relationship with the manufacturer can relay impor-
tant concerns about product safety, and may ultimately refuse to market the products
of a manufacturer that has produced defective products in the past. Justice Lucas
reasoned that the ability of a retailer or distributor to exert this fiscal pressure on the
258. Id. (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
259. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
260. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 482, 698 P.2d at 135. 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting);
see id. (accusing the majority of ignoring "the fact that landlords of used property have no special position with
regard to original manufacturers and sellers and thus have no influence to wield in order to improve product
safety").
261. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
262. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 482, 698 P.2d at 135. 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
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manufacturer was the foundation of liability without fault. 63 In sum, he concluded
that safer housing would not result from the use of the doctrine. Therefore, bringing
landlords within the class of potential defendants in an action based on strict liability
in tort was simply unwarranted.2 4
IV. HOLDING BECKER TO ITS FACTS
A. Patent Defects and Landlords with Only One Rental
Five years after California's Supreme Court extended the doctrine of strict
liability in tort to include landlords, an appellate court, in Vaerst v. Tanzman,265 was
forced to define the parameters of the Becker decision. At least two questions were
left unanswered under the majority's opinion in Becker. The first question was
whether the doctrine was to be imposed in only those cases involving latent defects.
The second question was whether Becker was limited to only those landlords that
owned multiple units.
In Vaerst, the defendant rented out his primary residence after his employer
transferred him to a different state.266 The plaintiff, a woman in her late 80s, was a
dinner guest of the defendant's tenants. 267 Following dinner, as the plaintiff walked
down a flight of stairs, she believed she was at the end of the stairway because the
handrail stopped.268 Unfortunately, the plaintiff had only reached a landing, and the
staircase descended one more step.269 She turned to enter the hallway, fell over the
remaining step, and sustained injuries including a broken hip.270
The lower court refused to instruct the jury on the theory of strict products
liability.27' The plaintiff appealed and argued that, under Becker, landlords are strictly
liable for the injuries resulting from defects in leased premises.2 72 Ultimately, the
appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, and concluded that the holding
in Becker was inapplicable to the facts presented in Vaerst.273 The court pointed out
that in the present case the defendant only leased his own family residence to the
tenants on a temporary basis, and was not engaged in the "business" of providing
housing to the public, unlike like the landlord in Becker who owned a thirty-six-unit
263. Id.
264. Id. at 487, 698 P.2d at 139,213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting); see id. (stating
that the imposition of strict liability amounts, in effect, to insurance for tenants, because it does nothing to aid in
the goals of deterrence or product safety).
265. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1535, 272 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1990).
266. Vaerst, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1538, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1538, 1543, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 504, 508.
270. Id. at 1538, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1539,272 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
273. Id. at 1541, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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building.274 Becker appeared to require some showing of entrepreneurial undertaking
by holding that "a landlord engaged in the business of leasing dwellings is strictly
liable."275 The Vaerst court noted that it "has been repeatedly held that liability
without fault applies only to mass producers or mass lessors who play more than a
random or accidental role in the overall marketing enterprise. '276 What is required is
that the landlord play a "substantial role" within the rental enterprise.2 77 In other
words, an isolated act of leasing out the family home did not warrant the imposition
of liability without fault.278 The court never articulated what constituted being in the
"business" of providing housing or what playing a "substantial role" meant. Never-
theless, the point is moot today in light of Peterson.
In addition to refusing to impose strict products liability against a landlord who
was not engaged in the rental business, Vaerst held that the Becker decision was not
applicable to injury-causing defects that were obvious or visible.279 Rather, Vaerst
held that Becker was applicable only in those cases that involved latent defects in the
premises. 2'0 The Vaerst majority concluded that the actual injury-causing defect was
the absence of a handrail on the particular section of the stairway on which the plain-
tiff fell.2s They held that this defect was patent, visible, and easily detectable by the
tenants, whose knowledge was imputable to their house guest.282 Therefore, Becker
was inapplicable to the facts of Vaerst.
283
In reaching its decision, the Vaerst majority failed to discuss the fourth footnote
in the Becker decision, which reads: "We do not determine whether strict liability
would apply to a disclosed defect." 284 Thus, Becker expressly left open the question
whether strict liability would also be imposed in patent defect cases. On the other
hand, the ultimate holding of Becker states that "a landlord engaged in the business
of leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent
defect." 285 The conflict between the footnote and Becker's ultimate holding that
specifically uses the word "latent" did not concern the state's highest court. Three
months after the Vaerst decision, the California Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's
274. Id. at 1539-40, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
275. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (emphasis added).
276. Vaerst, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1540,272 Cal. Rptr. at 506; see, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,
466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court (Perez), 101 Cal. App.
3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980); Garcia v. Haslett. 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
277. Vaerst, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1540,272 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
278. See id. at 1541, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 506 ("Becker must be limited to its facts; that strict tort liability
thereunder may not be extended to instances where the lease of a house involves only an isolated act").




283. Id. at 1541, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
284. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 464 n.4, 698 P.2d at 122 n.4, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.4 (emphasis added).
285. Id.
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petition for review. 28 6 Thus, Vaerst made clear that the doctrine was applicable only
in those cases involving latent defects.
Nevertheless, the court's classification of the defect as patent turns on its own
assumptions, and is troubling for a number of reasons. First, the court concluded that
the absence of a safety feature, the handrail, makes the defect patent or obvious.
287
However, people generally prepare themselves for a potentially hazardous situation
when they see the use of safety features, like handrails, guardrails on a roadway,
rubber mats, or metal shields around the blades of power tools. The use of such
safety features serves to put people on notice that a potentially dangerous situation
exists. On the other hand, the absence of safety features lulls people into believing
that they need not be overly cautious or weary of danger. Second, the court focused
on the absence of the handrail, rather than on the entire staircase. Perhaps if the court
were to recognize the overall design of the staircase as the actual defect, they might
have concluded that the staircase in its entirety was a latent defect. Finally, the court
never suggested that the determination whether a defect is patent or latent should be
a question for the trier of fact. Rather, it believed that this was a question for the
court.28 The question whether a product is actually defective is one of fact, and is for
the jury's determination.28 9 Therefore, it is surprising that the Vaerst court did not
believe that the determination of a defect as patent or latent should be a question for
the jury. If it had, the defect might have been found to be latent.
B. Commercial Landlords
Shortly after Becker, an appellate court concluded that the policy justifications
advanced in Becker did not require extension of the doctrine to include commercial
landlords.290 In Muro v. Superior Court,29' the plaintiff injured herself when she
slipped and fell on the stairs in a commercial building.292 The plaintiff argued that the
premises were defective because the stairway was slippery and had no floor mat to
prevent people from slipping.293 The plaintiff filed a complaint stating a cause of
action under both negligence and strict liability in tort.
2 94
286. The California Supreme Court denied the appellant's petition for review on November 20, 1990, Vaerst,
222 Cal. App. 3d at 1535, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 503. Justice Mosk was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
287. Id. at 1540, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
288. See id.
289. See generally Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
239 (1978) (setting out properjury instructions to aid in the determination whether a product is defective in design).
290. See Muro v. Superior Court (Anjac Fashion Bldg., Inc.). 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1093, 229 Cal. Rptr.
383, 385 (1986).
291. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089,229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986).
292. Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1091. 229 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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The Muro court reasoned that neither the language nor the rationale of Becker
indicated any intent to extend the doctrine of strict products liability to include
commercial landlords.295 The court concluded that the fundamental policy underlying
Becker was the need to insure safe housing for residential tenants, who are powerless
to protect themselves.2 96 In other words, the Muro court reasoned that Becker was
attempting to put teeth into the implied warranty of habitability, a doctrine that is
applicable only to residential landlords in California.297 Legal commentators had
predicted that courts would eventually impose liability without fault to residential
landlords before Becker.298 However, no such prediction was made for commercial
landlords.299
Green and Becker perceived residential tenants as ordinary consumers who are
unable to protect themselves against injury-causing defects. 3°° Therefore, the respon-
sibility of protecting these ordinary consumers is placed on the landlord, who is in
a better position to bear the business expense of providing safe and habitable
housing.30' However, commercial tenants are more sophisticated and have a bar-
gaining position more equal to that of the landlord.30 2 Furthermore, the contents of
the lease, including the obligation of maintenance, are negotiated between the com-
mercial landlord and tenant.303 Simply put, commercial tenants are not powerless,
ordinary consumers. Rather, commercial tenants can insure against the risk of defects
in the leased premises because of their financial position. 04 Therefore, the Muro
court concluded, public policy simply did not warrant extending Becker to include
commercial landlords.30 5
V. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The fact that other jurisdictions had steadfastly refused to apply the doctrine of
strict products liability to the landlord-tenant relationship also influenced the
295. Id. at 1093, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
296. Id.; see id. (stating that the Becker analysis "focuse[d] on the development of the duties of a landlord
in the business of providing 'housing accommodations' to renters against the background of a need for safe and
adequate housing where the modem urban residential tenant, like the ordinary consumer, is powerless to protect
himself").
297. See id.
298. MILLER & STARR, supra note 235, § 27:77, at 380.
299. Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1097,229 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
300. Id. at 1093, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 384; see Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454.465, 698 P.2d 116, 123,
213 Cal. Rptr. 213, 220 (1985), overruled by Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995); Green v. Superior Court (Sunski). 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704,710 (1974).
301. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
302. Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1097,229 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1098, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
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Peterson court.306 Prior to Peterson, California and Louisiana were the only states
that permitted an injured tenant to recover for injuries without proving that the
landlord's conduct was unreasonable.0 7
A. Louisiana's Statutory Imposition
Today, in light of the Peterson decision, Louisiana remains the only state that
does not require an injured tenant to bring an action under general negligence
principles. Louisiana's Civil Code provides that a landlord guarantees the tenant
against all defects in the leased premises.30 1 If any loss results from a defect in the
premises, the landlord is liable a.3 09 Therefore, the plaintiff does not have to prove that
the landlord knew or should have known of the defects. 31ORather, the landlord is held
strictly liable.3"
However, if the tenant actually creates the defect, the landlord is no longer liable
under the statute.312 In addition, if the injured tenant knew of the defective condition,
and with the use of reasonable care the tenant could have avoided the injury, the
principles of comparative negligence apply.313 For instance, in Gallagher v. Favrot,1 4
the tenant-plaintiff stepped out the front door of his apartment building, fell, and
suffered injuries amounting to $10,000. 3 15 At the time of the accident, the landlord
was renovating the building, and the construction company had just removed the con-
crete steps and sidewalk at the foot of the front door.31 6 The jury assigned a portion
of the fault to the injured tenant, and reduced the award to $2000.3 " The jury was
convinced that the tenant acted unreasonable and contributed to his injuries.318
B. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc.
As mentioned in subpart II.C.4., the appellate court in Fakhoury held that the
doctrine of strict products liability was applicable to landlords.3?19 Shortly after the
Fakhoury decision, a number of courts throughout the nation were forced to deter-
306. Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 1193-95, 899 P.2d 905, 909-10,43 Cal. Rptr.
2d 836,840-41 (1995).
307. Id. at 1194, 899 P.2d at 909-10,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-41.





313. See Gallagher v. Favrot. 499 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
314. 499 So. 2d 1205 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
315. Gallagher, 499 So. 2d at 1206-07.
316. Id.
317. ld. at 1206.
318. id.
319. See Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473,476 (1972); supra Part l1.C.4,
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mine whether to apply the doctrine of strict products liability to the landlord-tenant
relationship.
In 1973, in Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc.,320 a New Jersey intermediate
appellate court refused to impose liability without fault on a landlord, and concluded
that a landlord's duty is not to ensure the safety of tenants, but only to exercise rea-
sonable care.32 t Several other jurisdictions have adopted the reasoning articulated in
Dwyer, and the California Supreme Court relied on it in Peterson.
3 22
In Dwyer, the plaintiff, while in the bathtub of her apartment, burned herself with
scalding water when a corroded hot water fixture came off the wall.323 The New
Jersey court advanced several reasons for refusing to impose strict liability on
landlords. First, the Dwyer opinion reasoned that the doctrine's underlying policy
justifications did not apply to the landlord of a multiple family dwelling.324 Unlike
the manufacturer, distributor, and retailer, landlords are not engaged in mass
production whereby they place their product, the apartment, in the stream of com-
merce, and expose it to a large number of consumers.325 Because the landlord has not
created the product, the actual defect is not preventable at the time of design or
manufacture.326 Furthermore, a landlord does not possess the expertise to ascertain
and correct the defective condition? 27 A product manufacturer, however, has the
capacity to investigate the cause of the defect and quickly correct the design or
assembly problem.328
Additionally, Dwyer pointed out that an apartment is a commodity wholly unlike
the typical consumer product.329 An apartment involves several rooms with many
facilities that numerous tradespeople have constructed.330 Further, an apartment is
subject to constant use and continual deterioration. 33' Due to these fundamental
differences, the court suggested that tenants do not expect that an apartment will be
in perfect condition for their entire occupancy.332 In other words, tenants do not rely
on landlords for assurances of safety in the same manner as do consumers of mass-
320. 301 A.2d 463 (NJ. App. 1973).
321. Dwyer, 301 A.2d at 465; see id. (explaining that the landlord's duty is "not to insure the safety of tenants
but only to exercise reasonable care, a landlord is liable for injurious consequences to a tenant by reason of defects
of which [the landlord] has knowledge or of defects which have existed for so long a time that... [the landlord]
had both an opportunity to discover and to remedy") (quoting Francisco v. Miller, 81 A.2d 803, 806 (N.J. App.
1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 1194-95, 899 P.2d 905, 909-10, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d 836, 840-41 (1995).
323. Dwyer, 301 A.2d at 464.
324. Id. at 466-67.
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produced goods. Rather, a tenant expects only that in the event anything goes wrong
with the apartment, the landlord will repair the problem when the landlord knows or
should know of its existence.
333
The court stated that the imposition of strict liability upon landlords would
therefore create "an unusual and unjust burden on property owners. 334 A landlord
would be saddled with liability for every injury claim resulting from any portion of
the building, whether reasonably foreseeable or not.3 35 The New Jersey court con-
cluded that it would be unfair to hold landlords strictly liable for a latent defect that
the landlord could not have possibly detected, and thus could not have repaired.
336
Therefore, Dwyer held that a tenant must prove that the landlord acted unreasonably
in the maintenance of the apartment to recover for personal injuries caused by defects
in the premises.337 In summary, in light of the Peterson decision, Louisiana remains
the only state that applies the doctrine of strict liability to a landlord-tenant
relationship.
VI. DEATH OF THE PARAMOUNT POLICY: PETERSON V. SUPERIOR COURT
In 1985, the Becker majority stated that the "paramount policy" of protecting
defenseless tenants from manufacturing defects is best promoted by imposing strict
liability on landlords.338 However, a decade later a unanimous California Supreme
Court flatly rejected this "paramount policy" argument, and overruled Becker?
39
Simply put, the Peterson court perceived the Becker decision as an unwarranted
extension of the doctrine of strict products liability.3 40
This Casenote's introduction presented the pertinent facts and procedural history
of Peterson.34' Additionally, Part I illustrated the harsh implications of Peterson
through the use of a hypothetical tenant injured by a defective ceiling fan.342 There-
fore, neither the background nor the implications of the holding will be discussed in
this portion. Rather, the purpose of this Part is to analyze the reasoning that





337. Id. at 465-67.
338. Beckerv. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 466,698 P.2d 116, 123,213 Cal. Rptr. 213.220.!985). overruled
by Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
339. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1188, 899 P.2d at 906,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
340. Id.
341. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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A. A Chilly Reception!
Several reasons motivated the Peterson court to overrule Becker. First and fore-
most, the court pointed out that the Becker decision had received a "chilly
reception. 343 In fact, Justice Lucas's opinion in Becker was the first of many attacks
against the majority's rationale.344 Additionally, California's appellate courts did not
openly embrace Becker's rationale.345 At the very least, the appellate courts in both
Vaerst and Muro were convinced that Becker should be limited to its facts.346 Signifi-
cantly, the Vaerst court observed that Becker represented a minority view which
Justice Lucas and Justice Mosk had vigorously criticized in the dissenting opinion.
347
Justice Lucas's disagreement with the majority also guided the appellate court in
Vaerst, and the Vaerst court reasoned that Becker constituted an unjust burden on
California's landlords.
348
In addition to Justice Lucas's dissent and the appellate court decisions that
limited Becker to its facts, the practice of other jurisdictions motivated the Peterson
court. 349 Aside from Louisiana, no other state had accepted the rationale of Becker.50
In essence, the California Supreme Court argued that the holding in Becker could not
possibly be equitable, since other jurisdictions had steadfastly refused to adopt the
rationale.35 ' Although this argument does not attack the doctrinal merit of liability
without fault in the landlord-tenant relationship, it certainly is understandable. The
court reasoned that there was something unsettling about holding landlords ab-
solutely liable for tenant injuries from latent defects simply because they choose to
undertake their enterprise in California.352
A variety of articles discussing and criticizing Becker influenced the Peterson
decision also.353 For instance, one theme that several commentators brought to light
was that imposing strict liability was inequitable because landlords cannot adequately
343. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1192, 899 P.2d at 909,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840.
344. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 479-87, 698 P.2d at 133-39, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 230-36 (Lucas, J., concurring
and dissenting).
345. See, e.g., Vaerst v. Tanzman, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1535, 272 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1990); Muro v. Superior Court
(Anjac Fashion Bldg., Inc.), 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089,229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986).
346. Vaerst, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1541, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 506; Muro, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 1098,229 Cal. Rptr.
at 389.
347. Vaerst, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1541 & n.2, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 506 & n.2; see id. (arguing that Becker should
be limited to its facts, and that other jurisdictions have refused to adopt the rationale).
348. Id. at 1541, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 506. '
349. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1193-95, 899 P.2d at 909-10,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-41.
350. Id. at 1194, 899 P.2d at 909-10,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-41.
351. Id. at 1193-95, 899 P.2d at 909-10, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-41.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1193. 899 P.2d at 909,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840; see id. (listing several articles discussing the Becker
decision).
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defend products liability actions.354 Under the test announced in Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co.,355 a defendant will prevail in a products liability action by
establishing that "the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in the design. 356 In making the risk and benefit determination, the fact
finder may consider
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that
such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse
consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design.
3 57
Most of these factors involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of
the manufacturer.358
Commentators point out that landlords, unlike manufacturers or retailers, might
not possess the technical knowledge, or generally have adequate access to infor-
mation about the origin and formulation of a particular design. 359 This lack of expert
knowledge seriously impairs a landlord's ability to prevail under Barker's risk and
benefit test.?'
Another article discussing the economic implications of Becker also moved the
Peterson court. This article explored the "risky business" of engaging in leasing
residential property in California.36' The commentator presented a hypothetical that
involved a tenant winning a large judgment against a landlord based on a theory of
strict liability. Unfortunately, the landlord's liability policy was not sufficient to
cover the judgment.362 Ultimately, the landlord was forced to sell the landlord's per-
sonal residence and rental properties to satisfy the judgment.3 63 The Peterson court
agreed that the onerous consequences associated with policy limits were a reality,
and feared that under Becker many small operators, would be rendered financially
insolvent.
364
354. See, e.g., Deeb, supra note 12, at 356; Rachel Leigh Yosha, Note, Landlord-Tenant: Landlords Strict
Liabilityfor Personal lnjury Arisingfrom Latent Defects in Premises-Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698
P.2d 116,213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985), 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 582.
355. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
356. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (emphasis added).
357. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
358. Id.
359. See, e.g., Deeb, supra note 12. at 356; Jeanne L. Early, Note. Let the Landlord Beware, California
Imposes Strict Liability on Lessors of Rental Housing, 51 Mo. L. REV. 899, 908 (1986).
360. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1209-10, 899 P.2d at 920,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851.
361. Haliday, supra note 12, at 371.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1207, 899 P.2d at 918-19,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849-50.
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While it is true that insurance policies do have limits, those limits are determined
by the landlord's business judgment and budget. Landlords generally have the option
of purchasing as much insurance as they desire, and predicate their decision based
on industry standards. Of course increased insurance costs will inevitably result in
higher rents. Nevertheless, the tenant will be safeguarded against the type of catas-
trophic losses that are possible under the Peterson decision. Further, the landlord will
be protected against an overwhelming judgment, while recouping the added in-
surance expenses from tenants.
Despite the ability of landlords to increase their liability coverage, the Peterson
opinion concluded that it would be unjust to subject landlords to the financial perils
of policy limits by holding them liable for defects that would not have been dis-
covered by a reasonable inspection.36 The Peterson court perceived landlords as
innocent parties in latent defect cases and, therefore, was unwilling to'place the entire
burden of compensating an equally innocent tenant on the landlord? 66 Labeling the
landlord as "innocent" is fair in latent defect cases because the landlord's conduct is
not at issue and, in many circumstances, the landlord has acted reasonably.
B. Three Factors
In Becker, the defendant argued that a landlord who purchases a building that is
not new should be exempt from strict liability in tort for latent defects because, like
"dealers in used machinery," the landlord is not part of the overall marketing
enterprise that provided the injury-causing product to the consumer.367 The landlord-
defendant relied on the appellate court's rationale articulated in Tauber-Arons
Auctioneers, which held that an auctioneer is not strictly liable in tort for injuries
caused by defects in used machinery.3 68 Tauber-Arons Auctioneers set forth three
policy considerations that would have justified the imposition of strict liability: (1)
Impetus to manufacture a safer product, (2) implied representation of safety, and (3)
loss-spreading.36 Unlike Becker, the Peterson court accepted the idea that landlords
are analogous to dealers of used goods. 370 Peterson relied on these three factors to
support its conclusion that landlords and hotel operators should not be held strictly
liable in tort for latent defects in the premises
3 7'
365. Id. at 1188-89, 899 P.2d at 906,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
366. Id. at 1207, 899 P.2d at 919,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
367. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454,465,698 P.2d 116, 123.213 Cal. Rptr. 213,220 (1985), overruled
by Peterson v. Superior Court (Paribas), 10 Cal. 4th 1185. 899 P.2d 905,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (1995).
368. Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court (Perez), 101 Cal. App. 3d 268,284. 161 Cal. Rptr. 789,
798 (1980).
369. Id. at 279, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (citing Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303-04 (Or.
1979) and Fulbright v. Klamath Gas Co., 533 P.2d 316, 321 (Or. 1975)).
370. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1201-02, 899 P.2d at 914-15, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845-46.
371. Id. at 1201-07, 899 P.2d at 914-19, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845-50.
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Regarding the first factor, impetus to manufacture a safer product, the Peterson
opinion echoed the reasoning of Tauber-Arons Auctioneers. Typically, the manufac-
turer, distributor, and retailer exchange information about liability claims or
particular products that are potentially dangerous.3 72 Thus, when a court imposes
strict liability in tort upon the retailer or distributor, the manufacturer is put on notice
about the defect and generally indemnifies those members of the chain of distribution
that were held strictly liable.373 Imposing strict liability results in safer products for
two reasons. First, because retailers and distributors will refuse to market products
that subject them to absolute liability, they will drop those manufacturers that have
a poor track record for safety. Second, the manufacturer will become aware of the
defect and remedy the problem in order to maintain the continuing business relation-
ship with members of the original chain of distribution. However, Peterson pointed
out that defects in apartments and hotels may have been created by the builder, a
subcontractor, a manufacturer of the building supplies or fixtures, a previous owner
of the building, a previous tenant of the apartment, or a guest of the hotel.374 Since
the current landlord or hotel operator normally does not have a continuing business
relationship or other ready channel of communication with any of these entities,
imposing strict liability in tort will not accomplish the goal of creating an impetus to
manufacture safer products. 375 Rather, the landlord will pay the claim and the party
responsible for the defect will remain uninformed of the dangerous condition.
As to the second factor, an implied representation of safety, Peterson reasoned
that a tenant cannot reasonably expect that the landlord will have eliminated defects
in a rented dwelling of which the landlord was unaware and that would not have been
disclosed by a reasonable inspection. 376The court suggested that the expectations of
tenants are substantially different than the expectations of purchasers of consumer
goods.377 Peterson, citing Green, pointed out that the implied warranty of habitability
does not require that landlords ensure that the leased premises are in perfect
condition, but it does mean that landlords must maintain bare living requirements.
378
In other words, tenants only expect landlords to correct those defects that would
render the dwelling uninhabitable. Additionally, Peterson stated that a tenant expects
that the landlord will maintain the property in a habitable condition, by repairing
promptly those dangerous conditions of which the landlord has actual or constructive
notice.379 However, a tenant cannot reasonably expect that the owner will correct




376. Id. at 1206, 899 P.2d at 918, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
377. Id. at 1204-05, 899 P.2d at 916-17,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48.
378. Id. at 1203-04, 899 P.2d at 916, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847.
379. Id. at 1205, 899 P.2d at 917,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
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defects of which the owner is unaware and that cannot be discovered by a reasonable
inspection.380 Therefore, imposing liability without fault would be unwarranted.
The court's conclusion that a tenant's expectations do not favor imposing strict
liability was probably inaccurate. The problem is that the court focused on the wrong
expectation of today's tenant. In typical product cases, the court imposes strict
liability because consumers need some assurance that the products are safe.
Consumers cannot fully inspect the products they wish to purchase because many
products are complex and well packaged. Not only do consumers expect to purchase
a safe product, but they expect to be compensated if they are injured by a defective
product. This is equally true in the landlord-tenant relationship. Peterson states that
a tenant expects that a landlord will eliminate only those defects that would be
disclosed by a reasonable inspection.38' A tenant expects a landlord to provide a safe
apartment. However, tenants also expect to be compensated whenever they are in-
jured by any defect in their apartment, whether latent or patent. The court appeared
to be suggesting that tenants, unlike consumers of other products, recognize that the
complexity of an older apartment warrants the assurance of safety for only those
defects that are open and obvious. However, this assumes too much. If anything,
California tenants expect that the law will always protect an innocent person that is
injured by a defect in the premises. Furthermore, today's tenant expects the landlord
to have insurance that will cover most injuries that occur on the property.
Another problem with the court's reasoning under this second factor is that it
suggests that the "implied warranty of habitability" is analogous to Tauber-Arons
Auctioneers' "implied representation of safety.' 382 The court reasons that tenants
expect to be safeguarded only to the extent that the implied warranty of habitability
provides. Stated differently, the court believes that the warranty of habitability
doctrine creates the ceiling for the implied representation of safety in the landlord-
tenant relationship. Unfortunately, the court overlooks the fact that the average tenant
is not familiar with the implied warranty of habitability. Therefore, the doctrine could
not possibly be the ceiling for consumer expectations. Again, the probable expec-
tation of tenants is that they will be compensated by someone if they suffer injury
regardless of whether the defect was latent or obvious.
The third Tauber-Arons Auctioneers factor discussed was loss-spreading.
3 83
Peterson pointed out that Becker relied upon this factor almost exclusively.3 4 Becker
stated: "The paramount policy of the strict products liability rule remains the
spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless
victims of manufacturing defects. 385 In sum, Peterson reasoned that it was unjust to
380. Id. at 1206, 899 P.2d at 918,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
381. Id. at 1205, 899 P.2d at 917, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
382. Tauber-Arons Auctioneers, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 281-82, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 796-97.
383. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1206-07, 899 P.2d at 918-19,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849-50.
384. Id. at 1206, 899 P.2d at 918, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849.
385. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123.213 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (emphasis added).
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abandon all other considerations and focus on the loss-spreading justification when
imposing absolute liability as Becker did.386 Peterson relied on Brown v. Superior
Court,387 a 1988 California Supreme Court decision that stated loss-spreading is not
the sole consideration in determining whether to impose strict liability for injuries
resulting from a defective product.3 88 Three years after Brown, the California Su-
preme Court, in Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,389 reiterated the point
that the function of loss-spreading should not be the exclusive criterion upon which
to premise strict liability.390 The Peterson Court was convinced that relying exclu-
sively upon the loss-spreading factor to justify imposing liability without fault was
creating a judicially imposed insurance system.3 91 The problem with focusing on
loss-spreading in isolation is that this reasoning could be used to impose strict
liability in any situation in which the defendant is in a superior financial position to
bear and distribute the loss suffered by the plaintiff.
392
C. Final Point on Peterson
The supreme court might have decided Peterson differently if one fact were
changed. Since Kohler, the bathtub's manufacturer, was amenable and willing to
settle the case for $600,000, Nadine Peterson was guaranteed compensation for her
personal injuries. 393 However, if her injuries were caused by a defective product that
was produced by a judgment-proof defendant, the court might have been less willing
to overrule the Becker decision. Recall the hypothetical tenant presented in Part I of
this Casenote and the harsh financial implications associated with the Peterson
decision-specifically, the hardship that results when the manufacturer is insolvent
or nonexistent. Had the manufacturer been insolvent in Peterson, the court might
have at the very least devoted attention to discussing the financial implications of its
holding. Instead, the court sidestepped the potential for catastrophic losses by
pointing out that injured tenants or hotel guests could still bring an action based on
negligence against their landlord or hotel operator.394 However, in rare circumstances
not unlike the Part I hypothetical, injured tenants will simply be unable to prove that
the landlord's conduct was unreasonable, and therefore would be forced to absorb
the entire costs associated with their injuries.
386. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1207-08, 899 P.2d at 918-19.43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849-50.
387. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
388. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1207-08, 899 P.2d at 919,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850.
389. 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549,281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991).
390. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1208, 899 P.2d at 919,43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850; see Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 994,
810 P.2d at 552,281 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
391. Peterson, 10 Cal. 4th at 1208, 899 P.2d at 919.43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 1210, 899 P.2d at 920-21, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851-52.
394. Id.
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VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
In discussing the policy of stare decisis, the Peterson opinion quotes Justice
Rufledge: "Wisdom too often never comes, so one ought not to reject it merely if it
comes late."395 Does the Peterson decision constitute wisdom? The answer hinges on
whether the factor of "spreading throughout society the cost of compensating
defenseless victims of manufacturing defects" is actually theparamountpolicy of the
strict products liability doctrine (the position of Becker), or whether this loss-
spreading factor is merely one of many justifications that must be considered (the
position of Peterson). Notwithstanding the question of wisdom, Peterson constitutes
the current state of the law. Unfortunately, as was explained in Part I, the new rule
has harsh financial implications for some injured tenants.396 Therefore, this Casenote
proposes that the state's legislature fashion a law that embraces the concerns ex-
pressed by Peterson, yet provides protection to seriously injured tenants by creating
a mandatory catastrophic insurance system.
The general framework of the proposed catastrophic insurance system avoids the
great bulk of potential suits, which worried insurance carriers and landlords before
Peterson,397 by covering only those personal injury claims that are in excess of
$25,000. In other words, tenants that are injured by latent defects whose total claim
for compensatory damages is less than $25,000 would not be permitted to pursue
reimbursement through the landlord's catastrophic liability policy under a strict pro-
ducts liability theory. Additionally, the proposed solution would require the plaintiff
to pursue the manufacturer of the defective product before initiating a claim against
the landlord's catastrophic liability policy. Lastly, the system would force both plain-
tiff's and defense counsel to value the claim in good faith. An independent valuation
of the claim would be conducted by an arbitrator when the case's worth is disputed.
However, to promote good faith between counsel, the arbitrator would award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party for the cost associated with deciding whether
the claim met the requisite $25,000 threshold.
Clearly the proposed legislative solution does not provide tenants with the same
level of protection as did Becker. Those tenants with claims under $25,000, who
cannot show negligence, will be forced either to absorb the loss or pursue the manu-
facturer of the defective product. However, the solution is equitable to both landlords
and tenants. Specifically, the solution accomplishes the aspirations of the paramount
policy by compensating those innocent victims that are seriously injured. It also
serves to protect equally innocent landlords from the perils of the Becker decision.
Prior to Peterson, landlords complained that they were forced to bear the costs,
in the form of increased premiums, for what they perceived as nuisance suits.
395. Id. at 1196,899 P.2d at 911.43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842 (quoting wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,47 (1949)).
396. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
397. The fear of liability caused landlords to seek greater insurance and insurance premiums to rise. See supra
note 5 and accompanying text (discussing a 15% to 25% rise in insurance premiums for landlords).
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Establishing a $25,000 threshold, however, will eliminate the vast bulk of cases
against landlords under a strict products liability theory. Therefore, premiums for the
catastrophic liability policy will be substantially lower than liability premiums during
the Becker era.398 The proposed solution offers additional relief to landlords by
requiring the injured tenant to pursue the manufacturer of the defective product.
Forcing the manufacturer to defend the suit is consistent with the reasoning ex-
pressed in Peterson and with the strict liability doctrine in general.
In sum, the proposed solution requires tenants and landlords to share in the risk
of latent defects. Under the proposed solution, the possibility remains that an injured
tenant will not be able to show negligence or pursue the manufacturer of the de-
fective product. But those tenants that are seriously injured 399 and need compensation
most would be protected against the harsh financial implications of the Peterson
decision. Hence, the paramount policy of protecting defenseless victims is preserved,
but should be understood to protect only those defenseless victims that are seriously
injured.
398. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (reporting a 15% to 25% increase in insurance premiums),
399. For the purposes of this Casenote, "seriously injured" tenants are those who have claims over $25,000.
